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Celebrity and Schadenfreude: the cultural economy of fame in freefall 
  
Steve Cross and Jo Littler 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the popularity of contemporary expressions of delight in celebrity 
downfall, or Schadenfreude towards celebrity culture, and questions to what extent they 
can be understood as cultural critiques of economic inequality. For just as the economy 
has its own parables, so do ‘cultural’ expressions contain parables of normativity about 
economic life. We argue that Schadenfreude’s relationship to ‘equality’ can be read in 
terms of social, cultural and economic blockages, and investigate some of the history to 
this feeling by exploring different arguments over the meaning and status of ‘equality’ in 
modern and postmodern societies. This survey of its contested meanings highlights the 
distinctions which have been made and elided between property and identity, the 
economic and the cultural, and the political and the private. These geneaologies are used 
to interpret Schadenfreude, and to highlight the tension between two different aspects of 
contemporary subjectivity: ‘integrity’ and marketability of the self. By drawing on these 
contested genealogies and theories of equality, we are also arguing that Schadenfreude 
toward celebrity in its most common contemporary form cannot be seen merely as a 
superstructural phenomenon of a neoliberal base but rather as stitched into and as of a 
piece with this neoliberal culture. We argue that whilst Schadenfreude is able to be 
articulated in different directions, it overwhelmingly works to express irritation at 
inequalities but not to change the wider rules of the current social system, and its political 
economy often actually entails it fuelling inequalities of wealth. In these terms, 
Schadenfreude can be perceived as being intimately related to autistic economic culture 
and as being able to be perpetuated by coasting on its own status as an autistic response.  
 
Keywords: celebrity * cultural economy * equality * Schadenfreude 
 
It is fair to say that academic work on celebrity has focused more on processes of 
identification and longing rather than disidentification and disgust. Celebrities have most 
often been interrogated as objects of desire; the star’s specific attributes have been 
analysed in relation to specific social formations; and the popular contemporary rush 
towards the media spotlight has been discussed in terms of the ordinarily disempowered 
searching vicariously for the extraordinary validation that proximity to celebrity brings 
(Dyer 1987,1998; Holmes and Redmond 2006, 2007; Littler 2003; Marshall 1997). 
Celebrity, in all these accounts, however methodologically and theoretically divergent 
they may be, is figured as offering a positive promise, even if that promise is not kept or 
remains unfulfilled. It is studied as a phenomenon that harnesses the potential of people 
to dream, that speaks of connections that can be magnified, that creates what we might 
call ‘assemblages of emulation’ rather than blind imitation.  
 A widespread popular hostility to celebrities undoubtedly exists. It emerges 
‘outside’, or between the cracks, of ‘professionally’-produced media culture (everyday 
banter, email jokes, bitchy blogs), but also within those not-so hallowed spaces 
themselves (snide comments in newspaper columns, ‘revealing insights’ in magazines 
devoted to celebrity lives). From all these various locations one particularly graphic motif 
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is repeated again and again: the taking of pleasure in celebrity misfortune. Whether 
mocking Michael Jackson’s fall from grace, breathlessly reporting Lindsay Lohan’s 
losses or eagerly observing Britney’s meltdowns, the act of gleefully watching or pushing 
celebrities from their pedestals has become a major cultural trope. The vastly increased 
speed of the adulation/abjection cycle is exemplified by the case of Susan Boyle, the 
Britain’s Got Talent 2009 contestant and favourite to win, who went from YouTube 
darling (100 million hits worldwide) to ‘tragic SuBo’ within three or four weeks. 
To what extent might these expressions of pleasure in celebrity freefall -- or 
Schadenfreude at celebrity downfalls -- be viewed as intimately linked to contemporary 
economic formations? A number of commentators have pointed out that the phenomenon 
of celebrity is indicative of a society with profoundly unequal concentrations of power. 
For P. David Marshall, celebrity is a site of hegemonic struggle in capitalist democracies 
between ‘overtly public individuals’ and those constructed as an undifferentiated mass of 
‘demographic aggregates’ (Marshall 1997: ix). For Jeremy Gilbert celebrity is ‘inherent 
to capitalism from the moment of its earliest emergence’, its privileging of individualism 
and faciality as palpable in the Roman Empire as today (Gilbert 2003). For Nick Couldry 
the mediated zones of celebrity culture offer spaces of recognition gravitated towards by 
the powerless: and so the ‘hidden injuries of media power’ are tied to broader injustices 
of financial poverty and cultural neglect (Couldry 2001). In these terms the gross 
inequalities between the ‘ordinary civilian’ and the ‘extraordinary celebrity’ speak of the 
social and financial divides between rich and poor, haves and have-nots.
1
 Consequently, 
the proliferation of celebrity discourse over the past two decades can be understood 
(although this is a point rarely made) in relation to a broader context of the rise of 
neoliberal capitalism and its savagely widening global disparities of wealth and power. 
This paper examines the currency of such expressions of pleasure in celebrity loss 
and asks how they operate in relation to neo-liberalism. It argues that Schadenfreude 
represents a negative capacity in socially affective relations, one that desires equality, but 
is primarily unable to think it as anything other than ‘leveling through humiliation’. We 
consider this impasse on several, interrelated levels: social, cultural, political and 
economic. To begin with, we outline the nature of Schadenfreude’s impasse by 
considering its affective and emotional life. Secondly, we explore the paradoxical 
centrality and disavowal of equality to the modern ‘social imaginary’, in particular the 
contradictory tendencies of rejecting ideas of economic equality whilst embracing the 
idea of ‘equality of condition’. Thirdly, we explore how this impasse correlates with the 
cultural-political economy of celebrity, its tabloid lives and its turnover of stars. By 
considering popular pleasure towards celebrity pain on these different levels, the paper 
aims to demonstrate that contemporary manifestations of Schadenfreude can best be 
understood in relation to the production of a ‘subject of capitalism’ (Skeggs, 2004:64) in 
which particular subjective propensities are imbricated with differential logics of property 
and value. As Skeggs notes, ‘capitalism works for the preparation of an individual who 
might be: endowed with an ultimately self-interested rationality, convinced of the 
principle of equality, [and] dedicated to the concept of private property’ (64, our italics). 
In this article, we argue that Schadenfreude toward celebrities operates at the intersection 
between such contradictory elements of subjectivised desire which themselves have 
complex genealogies. In this sense, the paper mobilizes Deleuze and Guattari’s model of 
                                                
1
 ‘Civilian’ is the term used by celebrities for ‘non-celebrity’ members of the public. 
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a political economy of the psyche – thus moving away from notions of Schadenfreude as 
an ahistorical or universal feature of the ‘human condition’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1977/2004, 1980/2004). 
  
In this paper, then, our argument is that this particular reading of Schadenfreude 
as a type of ‘blockage’ or cultural paralysis also needs to be read in broader terms of its 
interrelation with other types of economy beyond that of an individualized ethical or 
moral economy. What is its relationship to wider social, political and economic 
ecologies? We are interested in how Schadenfreude towards celebrities has 
predominantly come to emerge, and be encoded, and why, by considering its longer-
standing discursive genealogies. For it is not simply performed by a few ‘bad’, 
transgressive or deluded subjects (see Hills 2002: 8-11) but is a component in a complex 
affective assemblage - itself formed in relation to particular economies and conceptions 
of equality – in which most people reading this work, like its authors, have participated. 
 
Schadenfreude’s affective and emotional life  
 
 In Celebrity and Power P. David Marshall draws our attention to the importance 
of the affective and emotional intensities circulating around celebrity culture. Marshall 
argues that the affective domain has important social implications, focusing his 
discussion on the proximity of politics and affect in the adulation of charismatic leaders. 
What is of particular relevance for our discussion here, however, is how he describes 
these flows of affect. He argues that ‘there are public forms of subjectivity that are 
privileged in contemporary culture because they are connected to particular ends and 
interests in the organisation of power’ (Marshall 1997: 203; see also Hesmondhalgh 
2005: 122). This is a useful formulation to help us consider the existence and prominence 
of Schadenfreude towards celebrity in popular culture because we might understand it as 
one such culturally privileged ‘public form of subjectivity’: a form in which a particular 
set of feelings towards celebrities are encouraged and travel across public and private 
domains.  
A related means of grasping how such public forms of subjectivity work can be 
borrowed from Sara Ahmed’s conceptualisation of ‘the sociality of emotion’. Ahmed 
proposes ‘an analysis of affective economies, where feelings do not reside in subjects or 
objects, but are produced as effects of circulation’ (Ahmed 2004: 8).
2
 Putting these terms 
together, we might describe Schadenfreude as a collectively constructed feeling produced 
through circulation. This is illustrated for example by the British-based sardonic gossip 
email newsletter and associated website Popbitch, which often features stories about 
celebrities who have been heckled or attacked by ‘the public’ for the enjoyment of its 
readers. One recent newsletter gleefully related how British TV star Alan Davies was 
kicked by a member of the public; another recounted how Harry Potter star Daniel 
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 Here Ahmed follows one convention in cultural studies / the humanities of using ‘economies’ as 
a descriptive term to indicate the circulation of something other than money. (If we apply this to 
the recent growth of analysis of ‘the economy’ using other frames of reference than that of 
neoclassical economic theory, or, in Fullbrook’s terms ‘post-autistic’ economics, then such work 
in these terms functions to analyse economic economies, or economies of economics.) 
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Radcliffe ‘spent at least one of his schooldays locked in a cupboard as fellow pupils 
shouted "magic yourself out of that, Potter!").
3
 In the case of Popbitch, a collective 
feeling of Schadenfreude towards celebrities is generated on a routinised basis. 
 But is Schadenfreude an emotion or an affect? The classic distinction between 
these two terms is drawn from psychoanalysis, where it is used to distinguish between the 
first and third person’s representation of feeling (in other words, affect is a state 
witnessed by an external observer). Recent critical theorists of affect including Brian 
Massumi have argued that emotion requires a subject, whereas affect does not: emotion 
indicates feeling given form and function, but affect remains ‘unformed and unstructured’ 
(in Ngai 2005: 25; see also Massumi 1995). Similarly, for Lawrence Grossberg, it is a 
contentless state of psychic energy (Grossberg 1997: 145-165). In our case, 
Schadenfreude has a specific object: the celebrity in question. It is also sometimes given 
‘form’ - for example, through the carefully crafted joke at the celebrity’s expense. In 
these cases, Schadenfreude can be classified as an emotion structured through an 
individual subjectivity. Its function, however, is less clear; and it is not always ‘strongly 
structured’, shading as it does into a more diffuse, ‘transindividual’ affective economy of 
resentment. In this case, Schadenfreude would seem to cleave more closely to the status 
of an affect. Indeed, the relationship between a subjectively meaningful or self-defining 
‘emotion’ and connection to a transindividual affective assemblage is invariably blurred 
or even precarious in the occurence of Schadenfreude.
4
  
 In these terms, Schadenfreude is what Simone Ngai calls an ‘ugly feeling’. Ngai’s 
work argues that ‘bad’ emotions, like envy, paranoia and irritation, can be thought of as 
existing in-between emotions and affects, as mediations between the aesthetic and the 
political that act as knotted or condensed ‘interpretations of predicaments’. Ngai is 
interested in the possibility of recuperating such negative feelings ‘for their critical 
productivity’. In this way she follows in the recent tradition of theorists such as Wendy 
Brown, and, like Brown, she counsels against the danger of romanticising them. As Paulo 
Virno warns, such ‘sentiments of disenchantment’ which once marked a radical distance 
and alienation from exploited labour – like anxiety, distraction and cynicism – have, in 
post-Fordist/ late capitalist societies, become ‘the very lubricants of the economic system 
which they came into being to oppose’ (Ngai 2005: 4).  
 If they are no longer ‘radical’, how, then, are these ‘ugly feelings’ positioned in 
contemporary culture? Ngai suggests that they often play an ambivalent social role. She 
points out that they are mainly ‘canonically minor,’ opposed to the high drama of hatred 
or passion, and conducts a careful analysis of the workings of these minor emotions 
across various literary texts. Most interestingly for our discussion here, Ngai concludes 
that the very ‘weakness’ of these canonically marginal feelings structures what they can 
do. She argues that  
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 http://www.popbitch.com/home/category/latest-issue/ Accessed 24 April 2009 
4
 If relationship to the celebrity is experienced through the subjectivising property of ‘emotion’, 
the relationship can become ‘personal’ and take on a ‘pathological’ quality marked by forms of 
over-identification or fantasies of personal familiarity. In its pathological over-investment 
however adulation is equally prone to reversal as the obsessive fan morphs into the murderous 
stalker. This operatic intensification of the more depersonalised economy of affect in relation to 
celebrity nonetheless highlights something of affect’s own disavowed negative potential; a 
potential that is manifest in Schadenfreude. 
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[ ] the unsuitability of these weakly intentional feelings for forceful or 
unambiguous action is precisely what amplifies their power to diagnose 
situations, and situations marked by blocked or thwarted action in particular. 
(Ngai 28) [our italics] 
 
This interpretation of minor ugly feelings as diagnosing ‘situations marked by blocked or 
thwarted action’ is particularly applicable to Schadenfreude in relation to celebrity 
downfall. The enjoyment of celebrity misfortune or humiliation fulfils a specific cultural 
function precisely because it offers vicarious pleasure in the witnessing of the powerful 
being made less powerful; it is an attempt to address or deal with a severe imbalance of 
power.  
 But acknowledging its ‘diagnostic’ quality and role also raises questions about its 
effectiveness, its ethical status and the diversity of uses to which it is put. To take the 
issues of ethics and diverse uses first, it is important to point out that the meaning of 
Schadenfreude and how it can be mobilised is neither guaranteed nor fixed. In his book-
length study of the subject, When bad things happen to other people, John Portmann 
argues that Schadenfreude most often appears in minor situations of suffering where it 
tends to be of a comic nature, ‘help[ing] us withstand the difficulties of living’ (41). By 
contrast, he argues, responses to more serious suffering tend to get couched in abstract, 
Kantian terms of justice. Portmann’s study is primarly concerned with the degree to 
which Schadenfreude given its proximity to both comedy and malice, can be said to have 
a more properly ethical basis.     
 Portmann’s analysis, which draws heavily on John Rawls’s concern with the 
ethical potentialities of envy, is useful in that, by avoiding any simple blanket moral 
castigation of the subject, it is able to highlight and provide a more variegated account of 
its sources and manifestations. Yet, the formal abstraction of Portmann’s schema is less 
helpful on the question of ‘effectiveness’ or at understanding what Schadenfreude 
actually does in relation to that ‘equality’ towards which it gestures. Here it is useful to 
return to Ngai’s understanding of Schadenfreude as acting primarily ‘to diagnose a 
situation marked by blocked [and] thwarted action’. For in one significant sense, the scale 
and the form of contemporary manifestations of Schadenfreude in relation to celebrity 
can appear to bespeak a social imaginary that is profoundly limited. These manifestations 
do not appear to offer a substantial or ongoing challenge to the structural inequalities so 
roundly personified by the ‘celebrity-class’. They appear unable to regard the notion of 
equality as anything other than the experience of leveling through personal humiliation. 
In these terms, Schadenfreude can be understood as a kind of ‘individualised’ outlet for 
thwarted desires of equality.  
 This is not to say that Schadenfreude might not be articulated in a number of 
different directions. As Lawrence Grossberg has pointed out in a discussion of affective 
charges in popular culture, the link between cynicism and wider forms of social cruelty is 
not guaranteed, and similarly neither is the link between Schadenfreude and wider forms 
of social cruelty (Grossberg 1992: 153). So, for example, Charlie Brooker’s caustic 
journalism in his BBC TV show Screenwipe extends his hated of celebrity privilege into 
an excavation of the media processes which create or augment such privilege. Similarly, 
it is perfectly possible to imagine that the Schadenfreude of a blogger or tabloid-reader 
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might co-exist with political activism, because Schadenfreude, like any other subjective 
propensity can be articulated in different directions. Nonetheless, we aim to show that it 
is inflected, produced and encoded by both long-term discursive geneaologies and 
contemporary neoliberal discourses of ‘meritocracy’. In the next section, to explore this 
issue in more depth, we consider Schadenfreude’s relationship to social economies; and 
in particular, because of its dependence on the theme of ‘levelling’, we pay attention to 
the extent to which it can be thought to address the issue of equality. This section is a 
fairly lengthy discussion of the different ‘languages’ of equality, which we discuss in 
order to help understand the social processes that are productive of Schadenfreude, in 
which equality figures as both desire and as foreclosed possibility.  
 
The Persistence of Equality: consciousness and social being 
‘…relations of community and equality are themselves but a never ending 
settling of accounts’ (Ranciere, 1995: 65) 
 
Equality ‘as a concrete social and political demand’ has tended to be thought of as ‘the 
child of the great revolutions’ (Callinicos, 2000:20). However, what constitutes 
‘equality’, and how demands rooted in ideas of equality might be made within the 
broadly liberal polities that emerged from the ‘great revolutions’ needs to be explored if 
we are to understand issues of its potentiality, persistence and ‘thwartedness’.  
 
The classic account of the form of equality that emerged out of the (‘bourgeois’) 
revolutions is delineated in Marx’s work. In On the Jewish Question, Marx sketches the 
contours of a particular type of relationship between the post-revolutionary citizen, the 
state and civil society. The essay comprises a critique of Bruno Bauer’s polemic The 
Jewish Question in which Bauer argues that, with the abolition of the religious character 
of the state, the formal opposition between particular identities (Jew and Christian in his 
polemic) would be abolished and that particularity within the secular state is therefore 
dissolved into a formal and universal ‘equality’. 
 
Marx sees in Bauer’s argument a key problem which relates directly to the way sociality 
is experienced in liberal capitalist states. As he argues, ‘particularities’ (of wealth, status 
or condition) are not abolished by ‘political emancipation’, but rather banished to the 
‘private’ realm of civil society. Thus, citizens who are formally equal to one another in 
legal-political terms nonetheless retain their ‘particularities’ within civil society and a 
firm distinction is retained between (abstract) citizens and (concrete) private individuals. 
Equality is, therefore, experienced as a ‘property’ of the citizen, and the experience of the 
self as a ‘communal being’ (as an equal among equals), is, Marx argues, possible only 
within the ‘phantom’ realm of abstract citizenship. This version of equality, Marx argues, 
is profoundly disjunctive, contradicted as it is by the parallel experience of profound 
economic inequalities that such an abstract-universal notion of citizenship cannot elide. 
 
Marx’s analysis offers a compelling account of disjuncture and contradiction in the 
formation of subjectivities through which we can begin to locate the historical specificity 
of Schadenfreude. Something of the powerfully affective dimension of this 
‘contradictory’ subjective experience can be seen clearly articulated in de Tocqueville’s 
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1830s account of democratic society in America, which figures ‘equality of condition’ as 
a ‘fundamental fact’ of emergent democratic society. Here equality and affect are 
intimately linked. From the quotidian (in which equality ‘daily gives each man in the 
crowd a host of small enjoyments’) to the grandiloquent (‘men pounce on equality as 
their booty and cling to it as a precious treasure they fear to have snatched away’) the 
‘passion’ for it ‘seeps into every corner of the human heart, expands and fills the whole’ 
(505). However, crucially, there is again a disjuncture between economic equality and 
‘equality of condition’: whilst equality of condition is experienced as ‘booty’ and a 
‘precious treasure’ which must be preserved at all costs, wealth itself is experienced as a 
form of ephemeral ‘circulation’, as a ‘wheel of fate’.. De Tocqueville also notes that ‘I 
know no other country where love of money has such a grip on men’s hearts or where 
stronger scorn is expressed for the theory of permanent equality of property … wealth 
circulates there with incredible rapidity and experience shows that two successive 
generations seldom enjoy its favours’ (54). For de Tocqueville, the passionate attachment 
to equality of condition, ‘scorn’ for equality of property and ‘love of money’ are central 
to the affective experience of democratic sociality. This affective assemblage, with its 
paradoxical language of property, is subjectivised in its production of individualities that 
must bind together elements of contradictory desire. As we will demonstrate, 
Schadenfreude comes to be experienced as a leveling process that both compensates for, 
and enacts, these central tensions. 
 
 
A further dimension of the centrality of equality to the modern social imaginary is 
provided by radical democratic theory, which can help us understand more about how 
Schadenfreude functions. Claude Lefort, for example, argues that ‘the democratic 
revolution’ is not simply a set of political institutions rooted in formal equality (1988: 
183). Rather, it is a complex of factors that influence all aspects of the social field whilst 
having profound consequences in terms of individual modes of subjection. For Lefort, 
social space and division are always already mediated through discursive modalities 
particular to an overall type of social form, a form which has a generative dynamic of its 
own beyond its putative infrastructural determination.  
 
According to Lefort the ‘revolutionary and unprecedented’ feature of democracy lies 
precisely in the fact that the ‘locus of power becomes an empty place’ (1988:17) which 
cannot be filled with a single collective agent. This indeterminacy is exacerbated with the 
emergence of capitalism and its continual upheaval of social and political institutions. 
Divisions between dominant and subordinate groups in contemporary societies are 
always potentially fragmentary and antagonistic, and the immediate consequence of this 
is that ‘natural determination’ is replaced by a purely ‘social society’ in which ‘any 
individual or group can be accorded the same status’ (18, our italics).  
 
In radical democratic theory, the ‘social’ is regarded as an open field of permanent 
antagonism with the subject of this antagonism figured as a subject of ‘lack’, a subject for 
whom the plenitude of full self-presence is always thwarted by the agency of an 
antagonistic ‘Other’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Laclau, 1990). The ‘form’ of democratic 
society therefore produces and sanctions a proliferation of points of contestation, an 
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endless staging of conflict on its groundless ground. Demands for ‘equality’ clearly 
figure as central within the proliferation of open-ended sites of contestation that make up 
contemporary sociality but as has frequently been noted these themselves tend to be 
routed through identity claims and concomitant desires for ‘recognition’ rather than 
‘redistribution’ (Fraser, 1995 & 2000; McNay, 2007).  
 
We would argue that in its contemporary manifestations Schadenfreude to a large extent 
endorses radical democratic notions of the proliferation of antagonisms and evinces the 
collapse of a ‘natural’ order and its replacement with ontological indeterminacy. 
Schadenfreude towards celebrities is significantly different to notions of the temporary 
reversals of naturalised, hierarchical order in the carnivalesque, for example; its negative 
affect proliferates across the social field through multiple and ubiquitous forms of 
mediation that are not delimited by the circumscribed spatial and temporal specificity of 
‘carnival’.. However, as we will see later on, it can simultaneously function to sediment 
power relations, rather than to radically disrupt them, and the privilege and position of its 
targets are ‘naturalised’ in albeit highly complex and unstable ways.  
  
The work of Ranciere gives us a further language to help understand Schadenfreude’s  
relationship to equality. Ranciere’s work is suggestive for its framing of the question of 
equality in terms of both its persistence as the ‘only universal axiom of politics’ 
(Ranciere, 2004:86) and in terms of the profound and persistent opposition that it faces. 
Tracing the tension between equality and its opponents back to Plato’s political 
philosophy, Ranciere argues that we must distinguish between two discrete logics: that is, 
the logic of equality (the absolute and unconditional equivalence of any body with any 
other body) and the logic of police (1995, 1997, 1999, 2004, 2006). By ‘police’ he means 
the managed, ordered field of the ‘social’ and what this field legitimates as its 
perceptible, ‘natural’ elements, the places and positions which subjects and identities 
occupy within it. These can be straightforwardly ‘hierarchical’ in terms of a law of 
‘essences’ (as in Plato’s ordering of the city in The Republic) or ‘naturalized’ in more 
complex ways through notions of a hierarchy of ‘intelligence’ or ‘merit’. In either case 
they account for and legitimate rule by the ‘best’.   
 
 
For Ranciere, the essence of demands for equality is not so much to unify as to 
declassify: to undo the supposed naturalness of ‘police’ orders and replace it ‘with the 
controversial figure of division.’ (1999:30).
5
 As Ranciere argues,  
                                                
5
  
The discourse of equality is something which emerged in the contingent circumstances of 
the Greek polis: 
…ever since Solon had abolished slavery for debt in Athens, all cities had 
included a mass of poor people who, though unsuited to the practice of law or 
leadership, were nonetheless present in the city as free men, possessing the 
common name, the common title of the political community: freedom. 
(Ranciere, 1995:13) 
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…a political subject is not a group that ‘becomes aware’ of itself, finds its 
voice, imposes it weight on society. It is an operator that connects and 
disconnects different areas, regions, identities, functions, and capacities 
existing in the configuration of a given experience – that is, in the nexus of 
distributions of the police order and whatever equality is already inscribed 
there, however fragile and fleeting such inscriptions may be (1999 vi). [our 
italics] 
 
For Ranciere, subjectivisation does not emerge in awareness of the gap between a 
‘political illusion’ and ‘social /economic reality’ (as in Marx’s ‘praxis’). Rather, the 
egalitarian polemic itself ‘invents’ an always insubstantial community ‘determined only 
by the contingency and resolve of its enactment’ (1994: 87). This cannot simply be 
reduced to ‘the immateriality of egalitarian communication’ (‘the political’ in Marx). It 
exists as a permanent possibility which can erupt in ‘heroic’ form in (‘subjectivised’) 
demands for equivalence to be taken seriously in its case (civil rights movements and 
feminism being classic instances). Clearly Schadenfreude does not achieve 
‘subjectivisation’ in Ranciere’s terms: it is neither a demand nor a polemical statement of 
equal worth and thus not an ‘operator’. But it does evince a much more dynamic 
relationship between subject formation and equality as an inherent possibility than either 
Marx or radical democratic theory are able to capture, positing as it does a permanent 
conflict between egalitarian demand and police order which is immanent to politics as 
such. From our perspective, the transient and highly mobile nature of subjectivisation in 
its ‘heroic’ or properly ‘political’ mode is subtended with a more diffuse and more 
quotidian experience that both challenges and reinforces police logics. The leveling 
desire which in Schadenfreude expresses as the cruel laughter of humiliation at the 
individual misfortune of those who have got ‘above’ their station therefore become 
caught up in new ‘naturalising’ economies of worth and value. 
 
The tension between inequality of property and capacity for political subjectivisation 
which concerns Ranciere (2006: 95) is also at the core of Etienne Balibar’s argument 
about the efficacy of ‘equaliberty’, the conflation of equality and liberty which are 
‘identical in practice’, precisely because in their declaration in the founding documents of 
political modernity neither one can exist without the other (Balibar, 1994: xii). Balibar 
highlights how, historically, liberalism has insisted on the foundational and ‘mutually 
exclusive’ tension between the two poles of the revolutionary demand, equality and 
liberty (39). This tension is nowhere more apparent that in the encounter between 
‘equaliberty’ and differing conceptions of property and community. Thus for liberalism, 
‘liberty’ functions as the guarantor of a right to ‘unconditional private property’ (216) 
which equality has most often been figured as dangerously antithetical because of its 
encounter with traditions insisting on the transcendence of this property form and the 
institution of collective mechanisms for its distribution. Liberalism, which figures the 
individual as essentially ‘possessive’ (in McPherson’s term) and thus as a subject of the 
juridical ‘right’ to unlimited property, simultaneously casts property itself as outside 
‘politics’. As we have seen in de Tocqueville, such liberal discourse enters the domain of 
subjective experience through its negative attitude towards ‘equality of property’.  
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‘Politicised’ property has been central to modern understandings of individual value 
either as the subject of private possession or through arguments concerning the equitable 
allocation of resources. Indeed, if the latter option was frequently decried as adjacent to 
‘totalitarianism’ in liberal thought, it has increasingly been foreclosed as a possibility at 
all. Consequently, the inscription of individual value in relation to an aggressively 
naturalised ‘private’ property is subjectivised through the codes of political economy 
itself: 
 
Every property [of the person] is inscribed in the codes and equivalences 
formalised in the knowledge of political economy; every individual is a 
proprietor and measured by his property insofar as he understands the 
practical and theoretical science of the exchange of value, or is recognised 
by it (that is, is himself inscribed in its account books). Individuals…only 
have a relation to their being or their having by the mediation of this abstract 
knowledge…(Balibar 2006: 58). 
 
But this ‘mediation’ of the individual is always already a ‘transindividual’ (xii) 
phenomenon, a sculpting of the interiority of the subject which is a ‘folding’ of the 
outside in the production of an ‘inner self’ (Deleuze, 1988). In this sense the ‘psyche’ is 
at the intersection between the materiality of social relations (the ‘inegalitarian weight of 
bodies’) and the ‘semiotics of power’ (the signifying systems of ideological justification) 
(Due, 2007:79). The double gesture that inscribes self and others within schemas 
determined by exchange value means that individual being and having are always 
experienced in relation to others and, more precisely, to the value of what others have and 
what they are. Equivalences are therefore always also comparisons of net worth.  
 
However, although exchange values appear (as in the broader economy) to be related to 
transcendental properties which determine value absolutely, their worth is entirely 
immanent to the vagaries of the market. In terms of the ‘ordinary’ relationship to 
celebrity our individual worth is therefore experienced as relative in comparison to that of 
the celebrity in so far as the celebrity is thought (like the ‘highflyer’ or the precociously 
‘gifted’ individual in other walks of life) to possess properties that are intrinsically more 
valuable; those of a ‘natural’ or hard-won ‘talent’, for example. But this is not the same 
as the absolute determination of place which is experienced as a natural hierarchy of 
value in pre-modern societies and the relative difference in worth established through 
exchange value is inherently unstable
6
. The self, for example, is experienced as 
possessing an ‘intrinsic’ value of its own in a relational sense whereby this is measured 
against that of the other in a system of presumed meritocratic worth governed by an 
abstract justice that allots places accordingly . However, the apparent stability of the 
system of relative ‘meritocratic’ value collapses at the point at which value is shown not 
to be based on intrinsic worth but that of arbitrary exchange value. The celebrity who is 
recognized as simply ‘famous for being famous’ for example effectively abolishes the 
artifice of distance that notions of a meritocratic or intrinsic ‘worth’ must work to 
                                                
6
 This instability is the essence of Lefort’s characterisation of the ‘democratic form’. 
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maintain through continuous performance or display of a distinctive ‘talent’.  
 
In terms of subjective experience, Schadenfreude therefore enacts the process of leveling 
whereby value is reinscribed in the other in line with a radical reappraisal of its supposed 
‘intrinsic’ worth. But a full recognition of the arbitrariness of value based only on its 
market rather than its intrinsic worth would radically undermine the self’s belief in its 
own intrinsic worth, which is foundational to modern self-hood. Schadenfreude’s 
revelling in falls from grace is therefore a compensation for the slippage between these 
systems, underwritten by a righteous and accusatory apportioning of blame at the other’s 
apparently willed de-valuation (the drugs, drink or sexual excesses which destroy a 
‘natural talent’) or at the other’s exposure as ‘talentless’ after all. Even apparently 
‘natural’ (rather than volitional) catastrophes such as the signs of ageing or of bodily 
imperfections serve to reinforce the sense that the properties of the person are property in 
a quite literal sense. Intrinsic and market exchange value blur, as the conception that 
properties must be maintained and protected in order to retain their value in a system of 
exchange comes into direct conflict with the somatic limits of the life-span itself. The 
value of an intrinsic property (such as ‘beauty’) is not tied to the person as such but is a 
‘part-property’ alienated from the individual in the temporal continuum of the life-course 
and of worth only in so far as its upkeep can be guaranteed. An uneasy tension therefore 
opens up between a sense of self that is underwritten by notions of the inherent integrity 
of the person and its worth, and the value-giving marketability of discrete aspects of it.  
 
Ranciere argues that 
 
‘One enters the community of one’s equals not by being useful to them but 
only by being like them. There is no way of being counted one of them 
without reflecting their own image: an equal is someone whose image is that 
of an equal.’ (2006:70) 
 
A ‘celebrity’, on the contrary, is experienced as an ‘image’ through the complex 
mediation of discourses of worth and value which seek to maintain distance through the 
social fiction of an absolute differential ‘talent’. Even the much-cherished characteristic 
of celebrity  ‘ordinariness’, which appears to announce an equality of condition, 
underwrites inequality of property at the same time through ‘the merit’ of deserved 
success. The tension between such performances of being ‘one of us’ and conspicuous 
displays of wealth is held in check so long as worth is earned, and so long as the celebrity 
functions as an emblem of ‘making it’; in other words, as emblematic of aspiration. 
Losses of wealth, health, looks, career collapses, everyday misfortunes can be celebrated 
and enjoyed in direct proportion to their apparent deservedness. This is because 
enjoyment at such leveling poses no challenge to the delicate balance of an economy in 
which equality is both expected and desired but also feared lest its infinite regress put 
one’s own property in question.  
 
To conclude this section, we have, in some senses, come full circle from Marx’s position 
in which formal political equality is illusory in comparison to the ‘real’ positions 
occupied within ‘civil society’. Attempts to highlight the determinate effectivity of 
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political ‘form’ themselves require a theorisation of the transindividual subjective 
consequences of a ‘form’ in which equality is present as permanent but foreclosed 
possibility. The ‘democratic form’, the ontological insecurity experienced by those for 
whom power is an ‘empty place’, the exigencies of ‘equaliberty’, and the constitutive 
effectivity of antagonism are all at odds with what Ranciere describes as ‘post-politics’ 
(1999; see also Crouch 1994). Furthermore, the neo-liberal order has further closed down 
the political possibility where politics is understood as the claim to equality against the 
naturalised order of ‘police’.  
  
‘we are no longer in an age of expert judicial constructions designed to 
inscribe the irreducible ‘power of the people’ in oligarchic constitutions. This 
figure of the political and political science is behind us. State power and the 
power of wealth tendentially unite in sole expert management of monetary 
and population flows. Together they combine their efforts to reduce the spaces 
of politics. (2006: 95) 
 
 
Desiring economies: mediating Schadenfreude  
 
The sensibility of Schadenfreude can be related to both this longer political 
landscape and to the contemporary cultural conjuncture. In this final section, we explore 
what is at stake in the business of laughing at celebrity downfall at the present moment in 
the context of the reduced democratic space of neoliberalism. in more detail, paying 
particular attention to both the mediation of its contemporary affective dynamic and the 
economic logic it is bound up with. 
Of key importance in contemporary culture, as we have already indicated, is the 
myth of meritocracy. The dream of unlimited social mobility, that driving narrative of the 
post-Fordist era, has magnified very tangible and important examples of social movement 
in order to justify and push forward a system of deregulated flexibilised capitalism that 
entails a very limited and circumscribed amount of social mobility alongside increasingly 
stark divides between rich and poor. Thus, as David Harvey puts it, the hallmark of 
neoliberalism has been ‘the restoration of power to an economic elite [...] in the advanced 
capitalist countries’ by means of that ‘series of gyrations and chaotic experiments’ which 
only really converged as a new orthodoxy in the 1990s: the expansion of deep pockets of 
poverty emerging alongside ‘the rise of extraordinary concentrations of wealth and 
power, with the top 1% of income earners doubling their share of national income from 
6.5 in 1982 to 13 per cent in the UK and rising to 15 in the US’ (Harvey 2005: 21, 16-19, 
29-31). Alongside this, as Christopher Holmes Smith has written in his discussion of hip-
hop moguls, those that ‘make it’ need ‘the spectacle of the more impoverished masses for 
they give him the raw material, the literal human canvas, for which, and upon which, his 
ascent can be made emblematic’ (Holmes Smith, 2003: 85). The cultural desire for 
meritocracy or ‘making it against the odds’ exists simultaneously with desires for 
degradation and humiliation of those ‘above themselves’ or deemed to be at the end of 
their celebrity lives. It is in such a social and political formation that Schadenfreude 
functions: as the flip side of meritocracy whilst imbricated in its logic. For in this 
framework of understanding, just as people ‘go up’, so too do they ‘fall down’. 
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 The phenomenon of ‘knocking celebrities down’ does not merely resonate 
symbolically with this new meritocratic order, or with the genealogical inconsistences of 
the discourse of equality: it also operates as part of political economy through the ‘rise 
and fall’ of celebrity stock. Taking pleasure in the ‘fall’ of a celebrity, in other words, is 
not only related to the individual celebrity concerned, but to a larger ‘game’ of celebrity, 
a wider system of multiple rises and falls in which the ‘death’ (in terms of demise in 
status and media coverage) of one particular celebrity makes space for the rise of a new 
one. This structure is dramatized quite literally by the BBC online game Celebdaq, an 
online celebrity stock-exchange game where participants can buy and sell imaginary 
stock in particular stars (a cross between Fantasy Football for celebrity culture and 
Nasdaq).
7
 Equally, a ‘fall’ does not need to indicate the ‘death’ of a particular star but 
rather the death of their current image and the launch of another, a celebrity ‘rebirth’. 
Laughing at Paris Hilton’s jail sentence, for example, both helps generate further stories 
about the star and the later ‘re-invention’ of Paris as ‘good citizen’. As P. David Marshall 
has pointed out, to achieve longevity as a celebrity, the initial limitations of the presented 
personality must be transgressed. In addition, most internal celebrity narratives 
themselves also need to contain some element of ‘triumphing over adversity’ (Marshall 
1997).  
 The ‘downslide’ of celebrity therefore enables it to fit into a political-economic 
cycle: fame, downfall, to potentially be followed by re-invention and the restitution of 
fame (and from then on: to be repeated). On a broader level Schadenfreude works to 
mobilise celebrity longevity and acts as a means to enable celebrity culture to feed ever 
more inventively off its own carcass. The phenomenon of celebrity reality TV (like 
Celebrity Big Brother and I’m a Celebrity, Get Me Out Of Here!) is a particularly good 
example here. These programs often play on Schadenfreude by encouraging ironic 
laughter over the ‘washed-up’ nature of the former stars and D-list celebrities who are 
subjected to various degrees of debasement (whether being made to act as ‘servants’ for 
other contestants or eating bugs). Watching and laughing at celebrities ‘debase’ 
themselves, however, serves to pump up their celebrity profile and invent it anew. In 
terms of the political economy of celebrity, Schadenfreude towards ‘failing’ stars is an 
integral part of the cycle of celebrity culture: it has become part of the raw material of 
capitalist accumulation that is used to create further celebrity profit. 
 The popularity of the D-list celebrity is particularly interesting because it is a new 
cadre of celebrity in which Schadenfreude is ‘built-in’ through media commentary to 
their very persona. Gareth Palmer has suggested that D-List (sometimes termed ‘Z-list’) 
celebrities are a new phenomena that have risen to prominence over the past few years. 
The D-list are a mixture of ‘wannabees who never were’ (such as reality TV rejects) and 
those whose star is deemed to have faded; both groups are depicted as ‘still struggling’ 
for fame even though their moment has apparently passed. Palmer links the construction 
of this new subject to a wider ‘meritocratic’ celebrity context including reality TV 
(through its ‘spectacles of shame’ and celebration of the talent-hungry ) and to the decline 
of deference in its replacement of a ‘privileged peek into high society’ with ‘a new 
fascination with celebrities from a seemingly classless world’.  
Even though the D-list celebrity merely engages what we are all encouraged to do 
in these individualistic, post-Fordist days – constant self-branding – they are roundly 
                                                
7
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/celebdaq/. Accessed April 2009. 
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mocked as ‘getting above themselves’, partly because they are often perceived as having 
relatively low social origin and because they lack ‘proper’ PR. Palmer speculates that 
‘perhaps the venom so often directed at D-listers represents revenge for having to ‘kow-
tow’ to the demands of the micro-managers employed by the properly famous’. Here, 
mocking the D-list becomes a way of ramifying class distinction in an ostensibly 
‘classless’ realm and an opportunity for journalists to express both their frustration at a 
wider celebrity ‘system’ and their role within it. Significantly, by presenting the D-list 
celebrity as dumb or stupid for striving too much, for being ‘misplaced’ and not 
following the rules, they are being mocked for ‘failing to grasp their true economic value 
in the system’ (Palmer 2005; see also Dickinson 2008).  
The popularity of the desire to see celebrities fall down as well as rise up clearly 
indicates how this form of Schadenfreude is structured through contemporary discourses 
of meritocracy. It functions as both its flip side (in that people move down as well as up) 
and as integral to the continuation of its logic (there is a reciprocal and a ‘balancing’ fall 
for every rise of the ‘wheel of fate’ if there is to be room at the top). But as we have seen 
in the previous section, contemporary Schadenfreude and meritocracy are not only 
structured through the disparities of neo-liberalism (although this is of course crucial) but 
also, at the very same time, to longer-standing cultural discourses. Schadenfreude’s 
affective desire to seek punishment and levelling can itself help to explain how 
meritocracy works by sedimenting new logics of ‘police’ order against equality in 
Ranciere’s terms. It is structured through these modes of being - the very ones we see at 
work in de Tocqueville’s account of nascent liberal-capitalist sociality - in which we are 
taught to desire equality of condition but scorn equality of property. Schadenfreude, in 
other words, is in its dominant form an expression not simply of a thwarted desire for 
equality, but also a state which contains a conservative expression of delight in the 
uneven landscape of human material resources which it presents as ‘natural’. The 
emergence of a D-list star is therefore a moment which threatens the logic of 
‘meritocratic worth’, highlighting as it does the absolute arbitrariness of exchange value 
within the system.  The idea that ‘anybody can make it’ is central to the logic of ‘equality 
of condition’ which underpins meritocracy.  But the emphasis here is on the active 
process of ‘making it’ and the ‘anybody’ in the expression is always qualified in terms of 
its capacities for hard work: ‘anybody can make it so long as…’  What the ‘D-lister’ 
represents is a troubling reversal of emphasis: ‘anybody can make it’.  Here ‘making it’ 
appears to involve nothing other than the elevation of an arbitrary ‘anybody’ whose 
‘worth’ relates only to its immediate bankability within the ‘celebrity economy’.  
However, both the trenchant denunciations (they are rewarded for ‘nothing’! how dare 
they!) and the very generation of these parodic celebrities specifically to-be-scoffed-at 
works to defuse the systemic limitations it makes apparent.   
We can see some of the workings of these discourses in the realm of tabloid 
culture. Pleasure in celebrity humiliation connects to studies of tabloid culture in two 
ways: firstly, because demonstrations of Schadenfreude towards celebrities feature 
prominently within tabloid newspapers themselves (think, for example, of the Daily Mail 
or the National Enquirers’ propensity for glee in female celebrities looking off-par or in 
the throes of breakdown); and secondly, because an entire cottage industry of 
programming in the kind of entertainment-based media that is today often defined as part 
of the broader domain of ‘tabloid culture’ or as indicative of ‘tabloidisation’ is devoted to 
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the celebration or dissection of celebrity collapse (Nunn and Biressi 2008: 1-2, Gripsund 
2008: 34-44).
8
 The Sky One TV programme 50 Best Celebrity Meltdowns, which ranked 
celebrity outbursts and breakdowns in terms of how flamboyant and shocking they were 
deemed to be, is one example of the expansion of this genre.  
 Tabloids, in a similar way to the carnivalesque, have often been read as launching 
populist challenges to privilege (Bonner 2005: 86-92). As Anita Biressi and Heather 
Nunn put it, ‘tabloid culture thrives because its rhetoric, attitude and posture (with two 
fingers stabbing the air in a vulgar salute to high culture and its advocates) consistently 
speak to the majority of ordinary people and hold our attention’ (Biressi and Nunn 2008: 
1). For Ian Connell, tabloids bust through the politely acceptable discourse of the 
bourgeois public sphere. They  
 
break the boundaries that have been drawn between that which can and cannot 
legitimately be discussed in public, by drawing to their readers’ attention that 
which the bearers of public office have deemed private. […] They are rude and 
raucous intrusions into the sphere of rational public discussion and debate. Their 
contribution is like someone shouting from somewhere near to, but not at, the 
centre of the action; ‘Stuff the sophisticated arguments, the effete excuses and the 
labyrinthine qualifications – these ba…rds have been caught with their pants 
down.’ (Connell 1992: 74).  
 
In this way, Connell writes, tabloid stories ‘bash the “power-bloc” and aim to ‘not only 
[to be] revealing tales, but also tales which set out to teach moral lessons by exposing 
unworthy and unbecoming actions’ (Connell 1992: 74, 77)
9
 Tabloids work by articulating 
as antagonistic the relations between three different groups:  
 
1 powerful elites (from which are drawn the tragic heroes and heroines of the 
tales); 
2 narrators who are by a variety of means in touch with the goings on of the elites, 
but who are not at one with them 
3 the rest of us, the powerless ordinary people on whose behalf the stories are 
told. (Connell 1992: 81). 
 
Connell’s analysis resonates with but also complicates more avowedly populist accounts 
of the ‘anti-establishment pleasures’ to be found in tabloids (Hartley 1992; Fiske 1987). 
However, Connell is not uncritically celebratory, arguing that  
 
In a particular light the stories can be read as the expression of outrage on 
behalf of the ‘have nots’. This can be powerfully and pleasurably 
engaging. [ ] Like much populist ranting, however, these stories are quite 
conservative. They are not against privileges being granted, merely angry 
that they have been granted to the wrong people – to ‘them’ and not ‘us’, 
not to ‘me’. (Connell 1992: 82; our italics) 
                                                
8
 Itself originally an ‘industry’ rather than an academic term. 
9
 Connell cites sex outside marriage, an example which now dates the piece given that celebrities’ 
extra-marital sex is today usually taken as the norm than the exception.  
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An interest in how these populist and demotic sentiments are channelled to conservative 
ends is shared by James Carey and Graeme Turner, whose work on the cultural-political 
economy of tabloid culture has similarly highlighted how boisterous tabloid addresses are 
often directed towards anti-democratic populism and ‘increased commodification rather 
than enhanced political enfranchisement’ (Carey 1988; Turner 2006: 499). 
 This should not, however, blind us to the populist potential (see Laclau 2005) of 
the tabloid, demonstrated recently in the UK by the Daily Mirror’s support for the anti-
Iraq war movement (see Freeman 2007). At the same time, studies of tabloid culture and 
in particular Connell’s salient account provide us with one useful set of references for 
understanding how Schadenfreude or delight at celebrity downfall is mediated. They 
supply us with an account of how relationships between three sets of groups (‘elite’ 
celebrities, outraged narrators and ‘ordinary people’) are managed (often, although not 
always, in the interests of the outraged narrators, in the name of the ‘ordinary people’). 
This formation is not confined to tabloids, but is also the province of the ‘highbrow’ or 
‘serious’ media. (For instance, in British broadsheet newspaper The Guardian, Marina 
Hyde recently reflected on her ‘increasing Schadenfreude dependency’; her sense of glee 
that Princess Beatrice had her new car stolen and that Ronaldo’s Ferrari was a write-off 
(Hyde 2009)).  
In Ngai’s terms, ugly feelings have a ‘diagnostic’ quality, an ability to express a 
situation marked by blocked or thwarted action. Schadenfreude towards celebrities 
clearly falls into this zone. It expresses a reaction to the blocks ‘ordinary’ people face in 
relation to social mobility and recognition and the forms of inequality which are rightly 
perceived to constitute the celebrity economy. However, at the same time, 
Schadenfreude’s diagnostic basis is profoundly limited. This, as we have seen, is most 
apparent in the increasingly dominant trend by which Schadenfreude is routinely 
mobilized in ways which appear to critique the celebrity economy but is also central to 
that very economic turnover of celebrity capitalism that it critiques (as in Celebrity Big 
Brother). However, Schadenfreude’s diagnostic basis is also profoundly limited in other 
fundamental ways. And as we have argued, in order to understand why - as with the 
economic system ‘itself’ - we need to draw not only on contemporary analyses of 
divisions of wealth and power under so-called ‘meritocratic’ neoliberalism but also 
longer historical discourses which can help to contextualize them. For whilst 
Schadenfreude registers the graphic divisions of wealth under neoliberalism, its economy 
of adulation and abjection is also related to long-standing historical codings of 
personhood and property which form a ‘subject of capitalism’. Since the advent of 
industrial capitalism we have been taught to scorn equality of property as much as we 
have been taught to assume an equality of condition, ‘personhood’ or being. These 
divergent value systems cohere in our cultural economy, finding both their resonant 
expression and a dramatic space in which to play out their contradictions in popular 
delight over celebrity downfall.  
In this cultural economy, the reported glamour of the celebrity ‘lifestyle’ (through 
which massive disparities of wealth are coded) is deemed ‘worthy’ so long as relative 
notions of intrinsic value, which are mediated through the apparently ‘natural’ (though 
unequal) apportionments of ‘talent’, ‘beauty’, or ‘charisma’, can be maintained. Tabloid 
obsessions with ‘meltdowns’, bad behaviours, sudden signs of weight gain, the 
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appearance of cellulite or visible evidence of ageing all signify a collapse in distance and 
of the ‘natural fairness’ between these two economies of worth and value. This collapse 
in distance is necessary to the distinction’s construction: most often linked via discourses 
of fault and blame to apparent ‘failures’ to maintain the value of those properties deemed 
worthy of adulation (and therefore of all the rewards of the celebrity ‘lifestyle’). The free 
floating and ubiquitous feelings of scorn and outrage are therefore subjectivised in highly 
specific ways. The collapse of the hierarchy of value bespeaks a volitional squandering of 
individual talent which allows the subject of tabloid mediated Schadenfreude to feel 
justified in its desire for a humiliating levelling, a forfeiture of rewards no longer 
justified. Scorn and outrage are channeled into specific ‘feelings’ against named 
individuals whose just desserts underwrite feelings of pleasure at graphic accounts of 
their misfortune. It is the apportioning of blame for volitional misfortune
10
 that makes 
Schadenfreude such a powerful instrument in sustaining an economy of worth in which 
unequal reward is both celebrated and (safely) despised within the same moment. 
Schadenfreude, then, might be mobilised as a sentiment for progessive social 
change (ie to actually produce some form of equality of property alongside equality of 
personhood) but there are powerful historical reasons why is most often encoded within 
and reproduced as a more stultified and paralysed form of cultural economy, one which 
serves to reproduce its own terms. Whilst here might concievably be some popular, 
progressive potential in the delight over the demise of figures like NASDAQ chairman 
and serial fraudster Bernie Madoff, it can only too easily lend itself to propping up a 
conservative status quo. In the UK, for example, two of the most recent high-profile 
manifestations of Schadenfreude towards celebrities were the MPs expenses scandal and 
the media storm over radio hosts Jonathan Ross and Russell Brand’s on-air indiscretions. 
In both cases scorn at celebrity humiliation worked not so much to draw attention to cuts 
or inadequacies in public provision as to fuel further undermining of the public sector: the 
media calls for the BBC license fee to be scrapped, and the further deepening of ‘post-
democracy’ disillusion with all things political).  
Such paralysis resonates with the characterisation of neoclassical economics itself 
as an ‘autistic’ system by the post-autistic economics movement.
1112
 As Edward 
Fullbrook and others have argued, neoclassical economics as a discipline and practice has 
been codified in phenomenally blinkered form, from its early template which borrowed 
from Newtonian physics and worked with the idea of ‘an immutably given human 
nature’, through its mechanistic nineteenth-century model that envisioned a economic 
                                                
10
 Naturally, ‘volitional’ here is itself entirely arbitrary. This might range from classic narrative 
tropes of talents squandered, getting ‘above oneself’ in acts of hubris that misread the scale of 
one’s talent, being ‘found out’, or simply being a woman where this is deemed to require a 
permanent and often contradictory set of vigilances around personal appearance etc.  
11
 The post-autistic economic movement began in 2000 when French students created a petition 
lambasting their curriculum, stating that, instead, they wanted a curriculum based on a pluralistic 
approach to the subject, and has since influenced a wide range of critical approaches to 
economics from a variety of viewpoints.  
12
 Such paralysis also resonates with David Harvey’s account of how today the political 
left predominantly exists in a state of ‘cultural paralysis’ at the current recession and of 
articulating ways beyond the dominance of neoliberal economics (Harvey 2008 ICA 
talk), 
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universe which ‘exists in a void rather than an ecosystem’, shaped by the ‘forces of 
individual agents’, to the resurgent, post-Keynesian neoliberalism of the 1970s 
(Fullbrook 2007: 14-15). The ‘autistic’ internalism of neoclassical economics justifies 
itself through a closed system: it is autistic because it cannot position itself in relation to 
wider social formations or cultural ecologies. In this manner it correlates with the 
autistically limited nature of the critque of Schadenfreude towards celebrities. “Set ‘em 
up and knock ‘em down” relationships to celebrity gesture towards a levelling impulse 
between the ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’. But such relationships not only fail to 
actually reach this ‘levelling’ process (locating the ‘ordinary’ in a perpetual state of 
ressentiment, and failing to achieve anything like ‘subjectification’ in Ranciere’s terms) 
but also contribute to the marked un-levelling process of creating celebrity and thus of 
actually widening a celebrity/non-celebrity divide. In these terms Schadenfreude towards 
celebrities overwhelmingly becomes a logic of not only incorporated criticism but, as we 
have seen, a form of cultural-affective fuel for the longevity of celebrity. And as the 
process entails a continual looping, as it happens again and again (as institutionalized 
through magazines like Closer, websites like Popbitch and programs like Top 50 
Celebrity Meltdowns) it exemplifies a kind of autistic repetitive system. The narratives of 
‘making it’ and ‘losing it’ can be entirely complementary rather than contradictory, 
imbricated with one another in a cyclical process of rising and falling, like the operation 
of the mythical ‘wheel of fate’. Indeed, in its subjective apprehension this process is itself 
experienced as something like fate: as an internalized desiring economy in which 
adulations and humiliations are routinised and follow apparently inevitable logics: those 
of ‘life itself’. The very repetitions at work in these economies evince an inability to 
break with a cycle that is predicated in resentment of the adulation it gives while 
compelled to offer it again and again, even as it humiliates and seeks to destroy the 
objects of its adulation.  
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